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STRIKING A BALANCE:
THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE'S TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE AND POLICING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
Jay Rothrock*
"Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that when
information which properly belongs to the public is
systematically withheld by those in power, the people
soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful
of those who manage them, and--eventually-
incapable of determining their own destinies."
-President Richard M. Nixon, 19721
On August 3, 2005, the FBI raided the residences of Repre-
sentative William Jefferson, finding a stark reminder of the perva-
siveness of government corruption-$90,000 wrapped in aluminum
foil and stuffed inside frozen food containers in the congressman 's
freezer. More remarkable, however, was the FBI's subsequent raid
of Representative Jefferson's congressional office, which marked the
first time such a warrant had been executed on a sitting congress-
man.
The controversial separation of powers issues raised by such
a raid are mediated by the Constitution 's Speech or Debate Clause,
which confers upon members of Congress a testimonial privilege pro-
tecting them from any questioning relating to their legislative acts.
When the D.C. Circuit addressed the propriety of the FBI's raid on
Representative Jefferson 's congressional office in United States v.
Rayburn, the result was a broad interpretation of the Speech or De-
bate Clause's protection at odds with the Supreme Court's gradual
* Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, 2008; B.S., Florida State
University, 2004. Thanks to Professor Nancy King for her guidance and assistance. The
opinions stated here belong solely to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Vinson & Elkins or its clients.
1 Tim Weiner, The Cold War Freezer Keeps Historians Out, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993,
at E5.
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narrowing of the clause in a string of cases in the 1960s and 1970s.
This Article proposes a narrow conception of the Speech or
Debate Clause more consistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion. More specifically, this Article advances a new understanding of
the Speech or Debate Clause in light of a heightened state interest in
combating government corruption. This approach would mirror
other testimonial privileges based in the Constitution that accommo-
date superseding prosecutorial interests in light of the specific need
for evidence in criminal matters. By drawing procedural elements
from the treatment of other Constitutional privileges and implement-
ing investigatory filtering procedures designed to safeguard privi-
leged materials, it is possible to strike a more appropriate balance
between legislators' Speech or Debate Clause rights and the interest
in combating government corruption.
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STRIKING A BALANCE:
THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE'S TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE AND POLICING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
INTRODUCTION
With roots reaching back to English law, the Speech or De-
bate Clause has long been an essential postulate of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Stating that "for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place,"2 the clause was designed to preserve the
independence of the legislature while maintaining the balance of
power among the other branches.
Yet the independence provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause has often been abused both inside and outside legislative
chambers, as the practice of government corruption has been a con-
stant occurrence throughout our nation's history. Unfortunately for
the American people, the trends of dishonesty and fraud among legis-
lators are becoming only more and more widespread. In the past
three decades, at least seventeen sitting legislators have been in-
dicted. 4 Also within recent memory, Representatives Ney and Cun-
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
3 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (noting "the Framers' concern
for the independence of the Legislative Branch").
4 See Posting of Paul Kane to Ben Pershing, Capitol Briefing: Jefferson's Long Odds,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitolbriefing/2007/06/jeffersons-long-odds-a-look-at.h
tml (June 21, 2007, 7:36 EST). Senator Ted Stevens was indicted in July 2008 for failing to
disclose home renovation services he received from an oil services contractor, adding an
eighteenth name to this dubious list. David Johnston & David H. Herszenhom, Senator
Charged in Scheme to Hide Oil Firm Gifts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2008, at Al.
742 [Vol. 24
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ningham each pleaded guilty to felonies before indictments were is-
sued. Although historical corruption data is difficult to ascertain due
to both a lack of data and the perpetrators' significant efforts to avoid
detection,6 the pervasiveness of current government corruption is
well-demonstrated; a recent study shows an average across states of
2.12 federal corruption convictions for every 100 elected public offi-
cials.7
Perhaps even more bothersome than the increasing incidence
of criminal misconduct among legislators is the scope of their mis-
deeds. In his fifteen years in Congress, Representative Cunningham
collected $2.4 million in bribes. 8 In 1988, Representative Biaggi was
sentenced to eight years in prison after extorting almost "$2 million
from a defense contractor." 9 Incidents like these surely contribute to
recent poll findings that "[s]ixty-five percent of Americans give a
negative rating to the ethics and honesty of members of Congress."" °
5 Id. Representative Ney pleaded guilty to trading political favors for money and gifts,
while also admitting to conspiracy and making false statements. Republican Ney sentenced
to jail, BBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 19, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6280001.stm (last
visited Aug. 25, 2008); Representative Cunningham pleaded guilty to tax evasion and con-
spiracy. Seth Hettena, Former Congressman Gets Eight-Plus Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 3, 2006,
http://www.comcast.net/news/index.jsp?cat-GENERAL&fn=/2006/03/03/338098.html.
6 See Steven P. Lanza, The Economics of Ethics: The Cost of Political Corruption, CONN.
CTR. FOR ECON. ANALYSIS 4 (2004), available at
http://ccea.uconn.edu/studies/The%20Economics%20of%/2OEthics-
%20The%2OCost%2Oof'/o20Political%20Corruption.pdf ("Quantifying political corruption
is, however, difficult partly because the perpetrators work so hard to evade detection. But
Thomas Schlesinger and Kenneth Meier have argued that the number of federal convictions
of public officials for crimes involving corruption is a good proxy for the level of political
corruption across states.").
7Id.
8 Hettena, supra note 5.
9 Id.
10 Gary Langer, Poll: Americans Support Searches, ABC NEWS, June 1, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=2025343&page=l. The same poll found
that only twenty-seven percent of Americans view Congress as "ethical and honest." Id.
2008]
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Moreover, the true economic harm of government corruption
has only recently become clear." Government corruption leads to an
increase in the cost of doing business, raises institutional transaction
costs, and hampers economic efficiency.' 2 In fact, a recent study
found that a single corruption conviction per 100 elected officials has
a greater negative impact on job growth than a $100 increase in per-
capita state taxes.13 As the economic effects of government corrup-
tion become clearer, the case for a revised legal approach to the prob-
lem becomes stronger.
Despite this "rich" tradition of corrupt legislators, investiga-
tors and prosecutors continue to discover scandals of first impression.
Depending on the nature of the scandal, location of relevant informa-
tion, and whether the legislator is currently in office and in session,
investigating a corrupt legislator might take the separation of powers
doctrine into uncharted territory. In such cases, it is usually the
Speech or Debate Clause that serves as a mediator among the varying
interests of the three branches.
The latest scandal to so invoke the clause revolves around
Representative William Jefferson, a now tragic figure that repre-
sented the promise of America; the son of a grade-school dropout,
Representative Jefferson graduated Harvard Law School to become
"Louisiana's first black congressman since Reconstruction."' 14 Rep-
l See INT'L. INST. OF ADMIN. ScI., THE HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN CENT. GOV'T. 1
(Seppo Tiihonen ed., 2003) (noting that the study of corruption in large, industrialized na-
tions is a relatively new phenomenon, arising only over the last twenty years).
12 See Lanza, supra note 6, at 2 (summarizing the economic effects of government corrup-
tion).
"s Id. at 6.
14 Shailagh Murray & Allan Lengel, The Legal Woes of Rep. Jefferson, WASH. POST, Feb.
744 [Vol. 24
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resentative Jefferson made a name for himself in Washington as a
champion of Third World trade issues, serving on the Ways and
Means Committee and co-chairing the African Trade and Investment
Caucus, the congressional caucus on Brazil, and the congressional
caucus on Nigeria.
15
Either ironically or perhaps expectedly, Representative Jeffer-
son's alleged criminal conduct arose out of the very issues he cham-
pioned. According to the sixteen count indictment filed June 4, 2007,
Representative Jefferson accepted a payment of $100,000 on July 30,
2005 from an FBI informant whom Jefferson believed was also col-
laborating to pay-off Nigerian officials. 16 After successfully assisting
the informant in pursuing a $45 million investment in a high-tech
firm in Nigeria, Jefferson pressed for compensation from the infor-
mant, requesting a five to seven percent ownership share in the com-
pany as well as the placement of a family member on the company's
payroll to effectuate monthly payments for his benefit.
17
After accepting the informant's $100,000 payment, the FBI
raided Representative Jefferson's Washington and New Orleans
homes on August 3, 2005.18 In surely one of the most vivid images
to accompany any congressional misconduct, the FBI discovered
$90,000 wrapped in aluminum foil and stuffed inside frozen food
16, 2006, at Al.
15 Id.
16 Congressman Jefferson Indictment Timeline, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 4, 2007,
http://www.wwltv.com/topstories/stories/wwl060407tptimeline.16164dca.html [hereinafter
Timeline].
17 Murray & Lengel, supra note 14.
18 Timeline, supra note 16. Five other locations, consisting mainly of the offices of Rep-
resentative Jefferson's business associates, were also raided that day in connection with the
investigation. Murray & Lengel, supra note 14.
20081
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containers in the freezer of Representative Jefferson's Washington
residence. 19
In early 2006, the suspicion surrounding Representative Jef-
ferson increased when two of his business associates pleaded guilty
to crimes involving the congressman. In January, 2006, Brett Pfeffer,
a former Jefferson aide and the president of the informant's invest-
ment company,2° admitted to allegations of conspiracy as well as aid-
ing and abetting bribery of a public official. 21 In May 2006, Ken-
tucky businessman Vernon Jackson pled guilty to paying in excess of
$400,000 in bribes to the congressman.2
On May 20, 2006, the FBI raided the congressional office of
Representative Jefferson.23 It was the first time a warrant had been
executed in order to search the congressional office of a sitting con-
gressman. 24 Challenging the raid in district court, Representative Jef-
ferson moved for the "return of the property seized during the execu-
tion of the search warrant on his congressional office under Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the search
19 Timeline, supra note 16.
20 Murray & Lengel, supra note 14.
21 Timeline, supra note 16.
22 Id. Two additional bribery schemes involving Representative Jefferson surfaced in No-
vember 2007. In one scheme, Representative Jefferson allegedly asked a lobbyist for a U.S.
oil company for $10,000 per month directed to a family member in exchange for assisting
the company in promoting business in Africa. In another, the congressman allegedly lobbied
NASA to do business with a U.S. technology company in exchange for payments to Repre-
sentative Jefferson's family business and a relative. Prosecutors did not file additional
charges based on this information, but instead intended to use this information to establish a
pattern of wrongdoing at trial when prosecuting the current charges against the congressman.
Congressman Accused of 2 New Bribery Schemes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2007.
23 Timeline, supra note 16.
24 See A. David Pardo et al., Public Corruption, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 855, 868-69 (2007)
(noting that after the Representative Jefferson scandal, the question "whether [the Speech or
Debate Clause] may be raised as a defense to the execution of a warrant to search the office
of a sitting Member of Congress... is no longer academic").
746 [Vol. 24
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was unconstitutional as it violated the Speech or Debate Clause, the
separation of powers principle, and the Fourth Amendment., 25 Al-
though the District Court upheld the constitutionality of the raid, on
review, the D.C. Circuit reversed, expanding the Speech or Debate
Clause's testimonial privilege to the point where legislators them-
selves may be able to exert control over criminal investigations of
26their own activities.
Rather than allow this expansive reading in the context of the
execution of a valid search warrant on a legislator's congressional of-
fice, the privilege should instead mirror other constitutional privi-
leges to accommodate the specific need for evidence in a criminal
matter. Part I of this Article outlines the development of Speech or
Debate Clause case law, tracing the Clause from its English roots
through its U.S. interpretation in the 1970s, analyzing the split in the
circuit courts regarding the scope of the clause, and finally interpret-
ing the effect of United States v. Rayburn, the case addressing the
constitutionality of the FBI's raid on Representative Jefferson's legis-
lative office and Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence. Part II ar-
gues that the Speech or Debate Clause's testimonial privilege, as in-
terpreted in Rayburn, is unnecessarily broad and undervalues the
public interest in investigating government corruption, particularly
when compared to other constitutional privileges. Finally, Part III
25 In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100,
106 (D.D.C. 2006).
26 See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 662-63
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Speech or Debate Clause required that Representative Jef-
ferson have the "opportunity to identify and assert the privilege with respect to legislative
materials before their compelled disclosure to Executive agents"). The exact remedy pro-
vided by the court under Rule 41 was "the return of all legislative materials (originals and
copies) that are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause." Id. at 666.
20081
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proposes that procedural safeguards and investigative filtering proce-
dures are capable of striking a balance between competing interests
so as to not unduly infringe upon legislators' testimonial privilege in
the administration of justice. The concepts of "use" immunity and
independent investigators are also examined as possible solutions.
I. TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE'S TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
The Speech or Debate Clause has its roots in English law,
where a similar provision was added to the English Bill of Rights in
order to ameliorate conflict between the House of Commons and the
Tudor and Stuart monarchs. 27 Its incorporation into the U.S. Consti-
tution was largely uneventful, without documented discussion or op-
position. 8
A. From English Roots to the U.S. Supreme Court
The clause's early days in the American legal landscape were
similarly unremarkable. Before United States v. Johnson in 1966, the
Supreme Court was rarely called upon to interpret the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause.29 The Johnson Court prognosticated that
the dearth of precedent on the clause's interpretation was due to the
27 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1966) (describing the incorpora-
tion of the clause into the United States Constitution). The clause was added to the English
Bill of Rights in 1689 after a string of monarchs misused both criminal and civil law to
"suppress and intimidate critical legislators." Id. at 178. For a full recollection of the
clause's often controversial English history, see Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives
of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REv. 879, 893-
97 (1985).
28 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177. Although the precise wording of the clause changed between
its initial appearance in the Articles of Incorporation and its final form in the Constitution,
this was for stylistic reasons. Id.
29 Id. at 179 (noting the lack of precedent on the issue).
[Vol. 24
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fact that "the tradition of legislative privilege is so well established in
our polity," leaving little need for "judicial illumination" on the
clause.30 Nonetheless, some basic tenets of the clause's interpretation
were hammered out in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 31 which held in 1880
that the Speech or Debate Clause should be read broadly. 32 Specifi-
cally, Kilbourn determined that the clause provides a substantive im-
munity which extends beyond mere "words spoken in debate" to in-
stead encompass "things generally done in a session of the House by
one of its members in relation to the business before it."
33
In contrast to the initial lack of judicial involvement regarding
the clause, the 1960s and 70s brought the Speech or Debate Clause
before the Supreme Court numerous times, bringing about a rapid
evolution in the Clause's interpretation. 34 The Johnson Court's hold-
ing, the first in this string of decisions, reigned in the Kilbourn
Court's expansive reading of the clause.
In that case, prosecutors brought criminal charges against a
congressman who allegedly agreed to deliver a speech to the House
of Representatives for money. 35 At trial, the government's case re-
lied heavily on the details surrounding the speech-the writing proc-
ess, the involvement of administrative assistants, the motive for giv-
ing the speech, inquiry regarding specific sentences of the speech,
30 Id.
31 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
32 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (summarizing early Speech or Debate Clause precedent).
33 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204.
34 See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legis-
latures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 221, 250 (2003) ("Building upon the Kilbourn and Tenney
decisions, ten more Supreme Court decisions between 1966 and 1979 dramatically increased
the jurisprudence concerning the federal Speech or Debate Clause.").
35 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171-72.
2008]
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and knowledge of facts supporting the claims made in the speech.36
Although the Court found the inquiry into the Congressman's
speech squarely precluded by the Speech or Debate Clause,37 the
Court's reading of the clause was narrow. First, the Court suggested
that the scope of the immunity provided by the clause may only apply
in a criminal context.38  Such a reading confirms that the primary
purpose of the immunity provided by the clause is the prevention of
"intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary."39 Further restricting the clause, the Johnson Court
gave great weight to the fact that the prosecution was made under a
general criminal statute requiring intensive scrutiny of the congress-
man's "legislative acts," going so far as to explicitly suggest that a
prosecution less reliant on legislative acts or pursued under a more
specific statute might not be protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause.4°
Importantly, Johnson impliedly differentiated the dual bene-
fits of Speech or Debate Clause protection. At the time Johnson was
decided, previous case law on the Speech or Debate Clause had only
conferred to legislators total immunity from suit for their legislative
3 Id. at 173-76.
37 See id. at 177 ("We see no escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judicial
inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive Branch under a general con-
spiracy statute, violates the express language of the Constitution and the policies which un-
derlie it.").
38 See id. at 180-82 (drawing from the English history of the clause that the avoidance of
intimidation the clause most directly seeks to protect is in the criminal context). But see
Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) ("[T]he Clause provides pro-
tection against civil as well as criminal actions ... .
39 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181.
40 Id. at 184-85.
750 [Vol. 24
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acts protected by the clause.4' In Johnson, the lower opinion of the
Fourth Circuit followed this precedent of issuing total immunity un-
der the clause, dismissing the entire count that relied on the inquiry to
the congressman's speech.42
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished previous case
law, in which legislative acts constituted the entire basis for the
charges before the Court, from the Johnson facts, where evidence of
the Congressman's speech was only part of the evidence of a broader
conspiracy charge.43 Thus, the Court held that "[w]ith all references
to this aspect of the conspiracy eliminated... the Government should
not be precluded from a new trial on this count, thus wholly purged
of elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause. 44 The John-
son Court, therefore, articulated a dual system of protection under the
Speech or Debate Clause; where a charge is based wholly within the
scope of a legislative act, the Speech or Debate Clause confers sub-
stantive immunity, but where the charge draws on additional acts be-
yond those protected by the clause, a testimonial privilege may be as-
serted to prevent the admission of legislative acts into evidence, but
the legislator can still be prosecuted based upon the unprotected evi-
dence.45
41 See, e.g., Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 200-04 (establishing the immunity function of the
Speech or Debate Clause in the context of a claim of false imprisonment).
42 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185 ("The Court of Appeals' opinion can be read as dismiss-
ing the conspiracy count in its entirety.").
43 See id. ("The making of the speech, however, was only a part of the conspiracy
charge.").
44id.
45 Some believe the substantive immunity provided by the Clause arises out of the testi-
monial privilege, despite the chronology of the case law on point. See, e.g., Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Based on the text
of the Constitution, it would seem that the immunity from suit derives from the testimonial
2008]
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The Johnson Court's contemplation of "legislative acts" led
the Supreme Court to further refine the term in three subsequent
Speech or Debate Clause decisions, each time further restricting the
scope of the definition.46 In determining that the Speech or Debate
Clause did not immunize a legislator from a bribery prosecution,
United States v. Brewster clarified that not all acts performed by leg-
islators are "legislative acts. 47 Rather, the term applies only to those
acts "generally done in Congress in relation to the business before
it."'48  In United States v. Gravel, the Court further narrowed the
scope of "legislative acts" to those which constitute "an integral part
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate., 49 Finally, the Court in United States v. Helstoski5° held
that the term "legislative acts" extends only to those past acts which
have already taken place.51 Thus, promises or future acts are beyond
privilege, not the other way around."). This is a logical, albeit irrelevant distinction. If a
court presented with charges wholly based within the scope of a congressman's legislative
acts refused to apply the substantive immunity conferred by the clause, the testimonial privi-
lege would bar the admission of all the evidence on which such a charge would rely, effec-
tively achieving the same result. Additionally, it should be noted that while Johnson implies
the creation of the testimonial privilege through the reasoning described above, many courts
cite its creation to Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615, 616 (1972), which first explic-
itly articulated and applied the privilege impliedly created in Johnson. See also Brown &
Williamson, 62 F.3d at 418 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court recognized the testimonial privilege in
Gravel ... ").
46 Because only "legislative acts" are protected by the clause, whether by substantive im-
munity or through the testimonial privilege, the dual protections of the clause share the same
precedent concerning the definition of "legislative acts."
47 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 (noting the purpose of the clause was not "to make
Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility").
48 Id. at 512.
41 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
50 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
5' Id. at 489 ("[R]eferences to past legislative acts of a Member cannot be admitted with-
out undermining the values protected by the Clause.").
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the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause.52
Documents used by those in the legislative branch and relat-
ing to "legislative acts" are within the scope of the Speech or Debate
Clause. However, the Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,53 a
civil defamation suit against a legislator, clarified that only those
documents with a legislative function are within the scope of the
clause, leaving those documents merely relating to the legislative
process, such as press releases, beyond the reach of the clause. 54 Like
the Supreme Court precedent described above, the Court relied en-
tirely on the definition of "legislative acts" to determine the applica-
bility of the Speech or Debate Clause to the press releases at issue in
the case,55 rather than addressing how the documents were obtained
and presented to the Court.56
B. The Circuit Split: Determining the Scope of the
Privilege
The lower courts have not interpreted the scope of the Su-
preme Court precedent uniformly, and have varying views on the
propriety of judicial determinations in the context of Speech or De-
bate Clause protection. United States v. Dowdy,57 which involved a
52 See id. ("Promises by a Member to perform an act in the future are not legislative
acts.").
5' 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
54 See id. at 130 (suggesting protection only for those documents essential to deliberation).
15 See id. at 131 ("[A] Member's published statements exert some influence on other votes
in the Congress and therefore have a relationship to the legislative and deliberative proc-
ess.").
56 The materials at issue in the case were widely distributed, and it is likely that the Con-
gressman himself would not have to be subpoenaed in order for the plaintiff to obtain the
relevant documents. See id. at 117 (noting that a newsletter at issue in the case was sent by
the Congressman to over 100,000 of his constituents).
5' 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973).
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former congressman's appeal from an eight-count conviction, best ar-
ticulates the Second and Fourth Circuits' broad understanding of the
Speech or Debate Clause.58 The Dowdy Court held that all acts
which are "purportedly or apparently legislative" fall within the
scope of the clause. 59 The Dowdy Court went so far as to prohibit
even the preliminary inquiry as to whether a congressman's act is
"legislative in fact," stating that "[t]he privilege would be of little
value if the[] [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and incon-
venience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader,
or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's
speculation as to motives. 6 °
Taking the opposite approach, the Third Circuit followed the
Supreme Court's lead by construing the Speech or Debate Clause
narrowly. This was best exemplified by Government of the Virgin Is-
lands v. Lee,61 which explicitly authorized a preliminary judicial in-
quiry as to whether the legislator's acts in question were "legisla-
tive.,, 62  The Lee Court, reviewing the dismissal of a four-count
information against a sitting legislator, read Heistoski's distinction
between past legislative acts, which are within the scope of the
clause, and those future legislative acts beyond the reach of the clause
as implying the necessity of an initial judicial inquiry.63 Key to this
finding was that the court viewed the Speech or Debate Clause testi-
" Id. at216-17.
'9 Id. at 226.
60 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951)).
6! 775 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985).
62 Id. at 523.
63 Id.
754 [Vol. 24
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss4/3
STRIKING A BALANCE
monial privilege as unlike the "attorney-client, physician-patient, or
priest-penitent [privilege], the purpose of which is to prevent disclo-
sures which would tend to inhibit the development of socially desir-
able confidential relationships," and instead referred to it as a "use
privilege," unharmed by a judge's in camera review.64
Initially, it appeared that the approach of the D.C. Circuit
would be more in line with the Third Circuit and the Lee decision
than the Fourth Circuit and the Dowdy decision. In McSurely v.
McClellan,65 the D.C. Circuit found a sitting Senator and his aides
immune under the Speech or Debate Clause for damages in a civil
suit arising out of an allegedly unlawful seizure during a field inves-
66tigation. Noting the "finite limits" of the Speech or Debate Clause,
the court undertook an inquiry as to whether the field investigation by
a Senator and his staff fell within the scope of a subcommittee's
"province" such that the Senator's acts were sufficiently "legislative"
to fall within the scope of the clause.67
Nonetheless, twenty years later, in Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., the D.C. Circuit appeared to take a broad reading of the
clause, seemingly at odds with McSurely. The case addressed
whether two congressmen had to respond to a subpoena duces tecum
in connection with third party civil litigation. The court held that the
Speech or Debate Clause barred even the discovery of privileged ma-
64 Id. at 523 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18,
587 F.2d 589, 596 (3d Cir. 1978)).
65 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
66 Id. at 1296-99.
67 See id. at 1286-87 (concluding that the field investigation was sufficiently authorized as
it "concerned matters 'on which legislation could be had' " pursuant to a specific senate
resolution) (quoting Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506)).
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terials from congressmen, as it diverts their " 'time, energy, and at-
tention' " from legislative functions. 68 In doing so, the court explic-
itly rejected the approach of the Third Circuit, which allowed the dis-
covery of congressional documents followed by an in camera judicial
inquiry as to whether they were sufficiently connected to "legislative
acts" before their admission into evidence.
69
While the Supreme Court has traditionally narrowed the scope
of Speech or Debate Clause privileges by refining the definition of
"legislative acts, 70 the Brown & Williamson Court implicitly ex-
panded the scope of the clause by broadening "questioning" to in-
clude responding to a civil subpoena. 71 The procedural question of
the Speech or Debate Clause's testimonial privilege was also brought
into question by that court's specific rejection of judicial review of
the privilege relating to "the purposes for which the information is
sought., 72 These holdings combine to place too great a control over
the privilege in legislators' own hands without providing for an ex-
plicit, effective procedure for judicial review. Over a decade later,
addressing the case of Representative Jefferson in United States v.
Rayburn House Office Building, the court would repeat this same
mistake, expanding the scope of the clause through the definition of
68 See Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 418-21 (determining the "absolute protection" af-
forded by the clause regarding protected legislative material necessitates the extension of the
privilege to third party civil discovery).
69 See id. at 420 n.10 (rejecting the approach of the Third Circuit as advanced in In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 589).
70 See discussion supra Part I.A.
71 Cf Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 668-69 (Henderson, J., concurring) (arguing that gathering
legislative materials under a valid search warrant did not violate the Speech or Debate
Clause because the congressman was not "questioned").
72 Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420.
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"questioning," and thus giving investigated legislators an unjustified
increase in control over information in a criminal case.
C. The D.C. Circuit Addresses the Case of
Representative Jefferson: United States v. Rayburn
Noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has not spoken to the pre-
cise issue at hand," as the case represented "the first time a sitting
Member's congressional office has been searched by the Execu-
tive, 73 the Rayburn Court unsurprisingly relied heavily upon Brown
& Williamson. The court summarized its holding in Brown & Wil-
liamson as "mak[ing] clear that a key purpose of the privilege is to
prevent intrusions in the legislative process and that the legislative
process is disrupted by the disclosure of legislative material, regard-
less of the use to which the disclosed materials are put. 74
Despite deciding Brown & Williamson in the context of a civil
matter, the majority apparently had no qualms about applying its
holding to the criminal prosecution of Representative Jefferson, stat-
ing that "the [Brown & Williamson] [C]ourt's discussion of the
Speech or Debate Clause was more profound and repeatedly referred
to the functioning of the Clause in criminal proceedings. 75 In the
application of these tenets to the search of Representative Jefferson's
legislative office, the court gave no weight to the ample procedural
safeguards and investigative filtering procedures put in place to pro-
tect Representative Jefferson's privilege. 6 Instead they found the
73 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659.
14 Id. at 660.
75 id.
76 The FBI "exhausted all other reasonable methods to obtain" the evidence sought before
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privilege violated, as the executive did "not deny that compelled re-
view by the Executive occurred, nor that it occurred in a location
where legislative materials were inevitably to be found, nor that some
impairment of legislative deliberations occurred.,
77
Finding Representative Jefferson's privilege violated, the
Rayburn Court went on to prescribe investigatory procedures that
would not have violated the Speech or Debate Clause.78 Convinced
that "[tihe historical record utterly devoid of Executive searches of
congressional offices [suggests that the issue will arise] at most, in-
frequent[ly]," the court specifically suggested "sealing the office to
be searched before the Member is afforded an opportunity to identify
potentially privileged legislative materials prior to any review by Ex-
ecutive agents. 79  While the court did not endorse notifying the
Member before executive agents arrived to search the Member's of-
fice, the court firmly held that "seriatim initial reviews by agents of
the Executive of a sitting Member's congressional office" are incon-
sistent with the clause's privilege. Since Representative Jefferson did
not argue that his privilege could not be judicially reviewed, 80 the is-
sue became exactly when and to what degree the Congressman
should be involved in asserting his privilege, and the Rayburn hold-
seeking a warrant to raid the congressman's office, conducted the search using agents with
no other substantive role in the investigation, and employed a filter team to shield the prose-
cution team from exposure to evidence protected by the clause. See id. at 656-57 (outlining
the special procedures employed in the raid). For an in-depth review and analysis of the
measures employed in the raid of Representative Jefferson's legislative office, see discussion
infra Part III.A.
77 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 661.
78 To its credit, the court did state the precise mechanisms that should mediate future in-
vestigations are "best determined by the legislative and executive branches." Id. at 663.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 662.
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ing allows legislators early, extensive, and unnecessary control of in-
formation in the context of a white collar crime investigation.
II. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE'S TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE AS GRANTED IN UNITED STATES V. RA YBURN IS
UNNECESSARILY BROAD AND UNDERVALUES THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN PREVENTING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
In addition to expanding the scope of the Speech or Debate
Clause's testimonial privilege by holding that response to a valid
search warrant constitutes "questioning" under the clause, Rayburn
also drastically changed the landscape of the privilege in another
way. By placing the initial, potentially unlimited control of Speech
or Debate Clause privilege in the hands of the legislator being inves-
tigated, the Rayburn Court radically changed the distribution of the
most essential investigatory element-information. The importance
of information control has been described as:
[T]he hallmark of white collar crime ...... "The de-
fense attorney's first objective is to prevent the gov-
ernment from obtaining evidence that could be incul-
patory of his client and used by the investigator or
prosecutor to justify issuance of a formal criminal
charge." These lawyers do not try to convince a jury
that the evidence is inadequate after letting [the] gov-
ernment gather its information. Instead, they work to
keep documents, clients, and witnesses away from
government agents so that a charge can be avoided or
a trial won .... Although other attorneys also seek in-
formation control ... none make it as central [as white
collar practitioners].8
81 M. David Ermann, 15 CONTEMP. Soc. 71, 71-72 (1986) (reviewing KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985) and LOUISE
I. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
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The degree of information control Rayburn grants investi-
gated legislators is inconsistent with both previous Speech or Debate
Clause precedent and the treatment of other testimonial privileges
conferred by the Constitution. As argued by the concurring opinion
of Judge Henderson in Rayburn, and implied throughout Supreme
Court precedent on the matter,82 the Speech or Debate Clause fails to
provide legislators with any sort of exemption from criminal process.
Moreover, other testimonial privileges grounded in the Constitution,
such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
and executive branch privileges are capable of accommodating the
specific need for evidence in criminal matters.
A. The Speech or Debate Clause Does Not Provide an
Exemption From Criminal Process
Judge Henderson is correct in her Rayburn concurrence that
previous Speech or Debate Clause precedent fails to provide legisla-
tors with an exemption from criminal process. In Gravel, the Su-
preme Court first addressed the Speech or Debate Clause's extension
into the criminal context, stating that the clause "does not purport to
confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress from liability
or process in criminal cases. Quite the contrary is true."83 The Su-
preme Court has echoed this sentiment in additional cases. In Brew-
ster, the Court stated that the "privilege was designed to preserve leg-
82 See, e.g., Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 668 (Henderson, J., concurring) ("[T]he Supreme Court
has made clear that the Clause 'does not purport to confer a general exemption upon Mem-
bers of Congress' from criminal process." (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626)).
83 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.
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islative independence, not supremacy, ' 84 specifically warning against
such a broad interpretation of the privilege as to "make Members of
Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility.
85
Using the above precedent to more appropriately frame the is-
sue, Judge Henderson criticized the majority's reliance on Brown &
Williamson due to the vast differences between the civil subpoenas at
issue and the execution of a valid search warrant as contemplated by
Rayburn.86 She noted that:
Answering a civil subpoena requires the individual
subpoenaed to affirmatively act; he either produces the
testimony/documents sought or challenges the sub-
poena's validity. In contrast, a search warrant requires
that the individual whose property is to be searched do
nothing affirmative. Instead, the search must first
meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment via
the prior approval of "a neutral and detached magis-
trate. 87
As a search warrant requires no affirmative act from the legislator be-
ing investigated, Judge Henderson differed with the majority, deter-
mining that this did not constitute "questioning" under the clause.88
Judge Henderson analogized this distinction between affirma-
tively answering a subpoena and passively being the target of a
84 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
85 Id. at 516.
86 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 666-67 (Henderson, J., concurring) (referring to the Brown & Wil-
liamson Court's discussion of the Speech or Debate Clause's testimonial privilege in the
criminal context as mere "dicta no matter how 'profound.' ").
87 Id. at 669 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
88 See id. ("The FBI agents' execution of the warrant on Rep. Jefferson's congressional
office did not require the latter to do anything and accordingly falls far short of the 'ques-
tion[ing]' the court in Brown & Williamson found was required of a Member in response to a
civil subpoena.").
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search pursuant to a valid warrant to the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 89 Under the Fifth Amendment's testimo-
nial privilege, "[a] party is privileged from producing the evidence,
but not from its production."90 Applying the treatment of this consti-
tutional testimonial privilege to that of the Speech or Debate Clause,
it reasons that, although legislators may assert their privilege when
questioned, absent such interrogation, congressmen should not neces-
sarily be able to object to the mere production of material protected
by the Speech or Debate Clause.
B. Comparison to Other Testimonial Privileges Under
the Constitution
The utility of looking to the treatment of other constitutional
privileges in construing the Speech or Debate Clause privilege does
not end there. Given the fact that very few testimonial privileges are
based in the Constitution, it seems reasonable to interpret the evolu-
tion of the Speech or Debate Clause in light of the more jurispruden-
tially developed doctrines of the Fifth Amendment and the executive
privilege. 9'
A hallmark of both the Fifth Amendment and the executive
privilege is that they are capable of accommodating the pursuit of
89 See id. (noting that under the execution of a valid search warrant, one is not required to
respond under either the Fifth Amendment nor the Speech or Debate Clause).
90 Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
91 The Rayburn majority analogized the Speech or Debate Clause testimonial privilege to
the attorney-client privilege in order to draw a comparison as to when privilege holders must
be given an opportunity to exercise their privilege. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662. However, this
comparison is of suspect value, as the attorney-client privilege is only "found in state court
rules or state statutes and the Federal Rules of Evidence," with no constitutional grounding.
C. Evan Stewart, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Internet: Strange Bedfellows?, 205
PRACTISING L. INST., 149, 151 n.2 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
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more substantial prosecutorial interests. In this context, immunity
grants are offered commensurate with Fifth Amendment protections
so that prosecutors might get at otherwise privileged testimony.92 In
the case of the executive privilege, a generalized interest in confiden-
tiality cannot overcome the specific need for evidence in a criminal
matter.
93
Although largely undeveloped, even the District of Columbia
Circuit in Brown & Williamson recognized that Gravel implies at
least some degree of balancing of interests when analyzing the
Speech or Debate Clause, leaving room for the possibility that the
clause might be able to similarly accommodate other prosecutorial
interests. In Brown & Williamson, the court stated that "Gravel's
sensitivities to the existence of criminal proceedings against persons
other than Members of Congress at least suggest that the testimonial
privilege might be less stringently applied when inconsistent with a
sovereign interest, but is 'absolute' in all other contexts. 94 Although
the Rayburn majority recognized this limitation on the clause, it
nonetheless completely discounted the interest in law enforcement's
investigation and prosecution of Representative Jefferson. 95 This ap-
proach severely undervalues the substantial public, and indeed gov-
92 See discussion infra Part 11.B.2.
93 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
94 Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419-20.
95 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662-63 ("Although the court has acknowledged, where it is
not a Member who is subject to criminal proceedings, that the privilege might be less strin-
gently applied when inconsistent with a sovereign interest, this observation has no bearing
here .. " (internal citation omitted)). The court's opinion leaves it unclear exactly why the
balancing of interests fails here. Conceivably, it could either be that in Rayburn, it was a
member who was subject to criminal proceedings, or the interest in law enforcement was
simply outweighed by the weight of the privilege, regardless of the defendant's identity.
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ernmental, interest in policing government corruption.
1. The Case For a Heightened Interest in
Combating Government Corruption
While the general interest in investigating and prosecuting
criminal acts is certainly applicable in Representative Jefferson's
case, the weight of the interest should be increased when the subject
of such an investigation is an elected official. Accordingly, the idea
of a substantial government interest in combating public corruption
has been advanced in many different contexts. Addressing issues of
campaign finance, the Supreme Court in 1976 specifically recognized
"the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption" in Buckley v. Valeo.96 The case addressed pro-
posed campaign finance reform in relation to the same illicit dealings
Representative Jefferson was accused of engaging in, which involved
a system of "large contributions ... given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, [by which] the in-
tegrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined., 97
Recent Supreme Court decisions continue to reflect the
heightened interest in preventing government corruption. In the
campaign finance context, the interest in combating government cor-
ruption has won out over an increasingly broad set of First Amend-
ment concerns.98 Most recently in Federal Election Commission v.
96 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
9 Id. at 26-27.
98 See Aaron R. Petty, Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 872 (2006) ("Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the gov-
ernmental incentive in combating public corruption to preserve public confidence in the de-
mocratic system outweighs even the strong First Amendment issues at play in the political
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Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,99 the Court ruled that entities such as
corporations and unions can engage in issue advertising with the ca-
veat that a reasonable observer would not perceive the ad as endors-
ing one particular candidate over another. 00
The proposition that the weight of the interest in combating
public corruption is more substantial than the interest in combating
private fraud is also well-supported. In addressing to what extent the
right of honest services under the mail fraud statute'0 ' extended to the
private sector, the Sixth Circuit stated:
[A]pplication of the "right to honest services" doctrine
to the private sector is problematic. The right of the
public to the honest services of its officials derives at
least in part from the concept that corruption and
denigration of the common good violates "the essence
of the political contract." Enforcement of an intangi-
ble right to honest services in the private sector, how-
ever, has a much weaker justification because relation-
ships in the private sector generally rest upon concerns
and expectations less ethereal and more economic than
the abstract satisfaction of receiving "honest services"
for their own sake.
102
process.").
99 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
100 Id. at 2667. See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 156 (2003) ("The Government's
strong interests in preventing corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, are
thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, amount,
and disclosure limitations" of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002). For another
discussion of the interest in preventing government corruption in a context outside the spe-
cific context of campaign finance reform, see Petty, supra note 98, at 872.
101 18 U.S.C. § 134-6 (2000) (including in the definition of a " 'scheme or artifice to de-
fraud' . . . a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services").
102 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 365 (6th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted). See also Daniel C. Cleveland, Once Again, It Is Time to "Speak More
Clearly" About § 1346 and the Intangible Rights of Honest Services Doctrine in Mail and
Wire Fraud, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 117, 145 n.241 (2007) (arguing that another justification for
government fraud outweighing private fraud is that "in private fraud cases, the victims are
often small in number relative to public fraud cases").
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Similarly, fraud in the form of political corruption or bribery has
"ethereal" consequences relating to the legitimacy of government
such that the state interest in preventing government corruption
should be weighed more substantially than a similar interest in com-
bating private fraud. In the words of Justice Brandeis, "[i]f the gov-
ernment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."10 3 Even
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines evidence these heightened conse-
quences, allowing an upward departure from the guidelines where the
defendant's conduct would contribute to the public's loss of confi-
dence in the government.1
0 4
With a heightened interest in combating government corrup-
tion firmly established in the above sources, the question becomes
precisely when legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privileges
should accommodate the prosecution of public corruption. In a case
like Representative Jefferson's, the public overwhelmingly supports
the idea that legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privileges should
accommodate a substantial interest in law enforcement. Eighty-six
percent of Americans believe "the FBI should be allowed to search a
Congress member's office if it has a warrant . . . . [regardless of]
separation of powers, precedent, and the possibility prosecutors could
use such searches to try to intimidate lawmakers."' 1 5 In order to pro-
103 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 (2008) (articulating upward depar-
ture provisions).
105 Langer, supra note 10. The poll found that this conclusion was "broadly bipartisan...
ranging from 78 percent among Democrats to 94 percent of Republicans." Id.
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pose a suitable standard, it is logical to look to other constitutional
testimonial privileges, which accommodate prosecutorial interests in
certain situations to determine exactly where the line should be
drawn.
2. Like the Fifth Amendment's Testimonial
Privilege, the Speech or Debate Clause's
Testimonial Privilege Should Accommodate
Superseding Prosecutorial Interests
The Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States'0 6 addressed
"whether the United States Government may compel testimony from
an unwilling witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring on the witness
immunity from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent crimi-
nal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived
from the testimony." 10 7 Although previous decisions had upheld the
constitutionality of immunity grants and compelled testimony in rela-
tion to the Fifth Amendment's privilege, 10 8 Kastigar explicitly reaf-
firmed earlier precedent and spoke clearly about when immunity
should be granted, and the substantial procedural protections that re-
main for those compelled to testify. 0 9
Currently, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005"10 collectively govern the
administration of witness immunity. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides, in
106 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
107 Id. at 442.
108 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956).
1"9 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 448 ("We ... reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ull-
mann.").
'10 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2000).
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relevant part:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide
other information in a proceeding ... and the person
presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this title, the witness
may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case....
Section 6003 allows U.S. Attorneys to request an immunity order
when: "the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and [two], such individual has re-
fused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination." 1 2
The Kastigar Court noted that immunity statutes such as §§
6001-6005 show "that many offenses are of such a character that the
only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime."'1 3 Mirroring these purposes, the U.S. Attorneys' Man-
ual lists several factors for determining when an immunity request is
in the public interest, which are:
The importance of the investigation or prosecution to
effective enforcement of the criminal laws; [t]he value
of the person's testimony or information to the inves-
tigation or prosecution; [t]he likelihood of prompt and
... 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
112 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (b)(1), (2).
.3 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446.
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full compliance with a compulsion order, and the ef-
fectiveness of available sanctions if there is no such
compliance; [t]he person's relative culpability in con-
nection with the offense or offenses being investigated
or prosecuted, and his or her criminal history; [t]he
possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior
to compelling his or her testimony; [t]he likelihood of
adverse collateral consequences to the person if he or
she testifies under a compulsion order.
1 4
In Kastigar, the main constitutional challenge to immunity
statutes was that, because they provided only "use" immunity rather
than full transactional immunity, the protection granted was not
commensurate to the suspended privilege." 5  However, the Court
found the language of § 6002 to comport with the scope of Fifth
Amendment protection, "and therefore ... sufficient to compel testi-
mony over a claim of the privilege." ' 1 6 Key to the Kastigar Court's
finding that use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination were the "substantial [procedural]
protection[s]" afforded those who testify under immunity.' 17
Many of these mechanisms and protections could easily be
extended to those legislators who assert the Speech or Debate Clause
testimonial privilege. Under the Fifth Amendment, immunity is
granted to a witness, removing the risk of incrimination commensu-
114 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-23.210 (2006).
u5 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449 ("Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes that
provide transactional immunity and those that provide, as does the statute before us, immu-
nity from use and derivative use.").
116 Id. at 453.
"7 See id. at 460-61 (noting that the prosecution's burden of affirmatively showing that
evidence is not tainted in a future prosecution provides substantial protection commensurate
with the scope of Fifth Amendment privilege).
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rate with the scope of the Fifth Amendment so that the government
may have access to evidence that would otherwise be unavailable due
to the privilege. Similarly, legislators could be granted immunity for
any privileged information accidentally uncovered in an investigation
so that the government may access the nonprivileged materials in a
given locale.
Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Speech or Debate
Clause privilege "has ... been construed to mean that one who in-
vokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted," allowing subsequent
prosecution based on nonprivileged evidence." 8  In the Fifth
Amendment context, the burden-shifting mechanism of immunity re-
garding tainted evidence provides "substantial [procedural] protec-
tion" commensurate with the scope of the privilege in the context of a
future prosecution. 19 This burden-shifting is not just to combat
tainted evidence, but rather to ensure that the evidence the prosecu-
tion "proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly in-
dependent of the compelled testimony."12 0  Incorporating a similar
burden-shifting mechanism in future prosecutions of those who ini-
tially assert the Speech or Debate Clause testimonial privilege could
provide legislators granted immunity in order to pursue the interest in
preventing government corruption with similar procedural protection.
However, the question then becomes whether the protection of the
burden-shifting mechanism is commensurate with the Speech or De-
118 Id. at 453. See also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185 ("[T]he Government should not be pre-
cluded from a new trial on this count, thus wholly purged of elements offensive to the
Speech or Debate Clause.").
119 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-61.
20 Id. at 460.
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bate Clause privilege. Discussion of this and other questions relating
to the feasibility of immunity grants as a solution to balancing the
competing interests of legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privi-
leges and the interest in policing government corruption is taken up
below in Part III.B. 1.
3. Like the Communicative Privilege Enjoyed by
the Executive Branch, the Generalized
Interest in Confidentiality Recognized by the
Speech or Debate Clause Should Not Prevail
Over the Specific Need for Evidence in a
Criminal Matter
The comparison of legislators' Speech or Debate Clause tes-
timonial privilege to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is admittedly an imperfect one. The Speech or Debate
Clause seeks to protect a wider range of interests than the Fifth
Amendment, which does not touch upon sensitive separation of pow-
ers issues. A hypothetical grant of immunity under the Speech or
Debate Clause seeks to get at evidence that is not privileged in the
first place in order to gain evidence against the person who first as-
serted the privilege. Conversely, a grant of immunity under the Fifth
Amendment seeks access to privileged evidence in order to gain evi-
dence against a third party. However, there is another constitutional
privilege which shares a number of salient factors with the Speech or
Debate Clause-the executive privilege as established in United
States v. Nixon.
12 1
Like the Speech or Debate Clause privilege, executive privi-
121 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (finding "Presidential communications" to be "presump-
tively privileged").
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lege is founded in ideas of separation of powers and branch inde-
pendence. 122  The Nixon Court addressed the claim of an absolute
privilege in the context of a refusal to answer a subpoena duces te-
cum in relation to a criminal matter, but found that neither separation
of powers nor the need for confidential high-level communication
were enough to justify "absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process."' 123
Although the Court noted the possibility that specific claims
of privilege, such as "a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic,
or sensitive national security secrets," may shift the balance of inter-
ests, it determined that a "generalized interest in confidentiality" can-
not support an absolute privilege.124 The Court thus endeavored to
resolve the competing interests in the general principle of executive
confidentiality and the specific need for evidence in a criminal matter
in a manner that preserved the essential functions of both the judicial
and executive branches. 125
Unlike the Brown & Williamson and Rayburn Courts, the
Nixon Court gave substantial weight to the interests of law enforce-
ment, noting its concern that withholding evidence "demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due
process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts."' 12 6
122 See id. at 706 ("The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of
the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is ar-
gued that the independence of the Executive Branch [operates] within its own sphere . .
123 Id. at 687-88, 706.
124 Id. at 706, 711.
1 5 See id. at 707 ("Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may
outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a
manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch.").
121 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712. See also supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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The Court further noted that "[t]he President's broad interest in con-
fidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a
limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some
bearing on the pending criminal cases.''
The interests at issue in Speech or Debate Clause balancing
are analogous. While the interest in maintaining an independent leg-
islature free from the harassment of other branches is certainly sub-
stantial, it is also broad and generalized. As was the case in Nixon,
the specific need for evidence was established in Representative Jef-
ferson's case; a valid search warrant was executed. 128 Given the out-
come in Nixon, it seems the testimonial privilege should yield to law
enforcement in that situation, even if the privilege is based in the
Constitution.
In fact, Representative Jefferson's case in Rayburn provides
an even more compelling argument that the interest in law enforce-
ment should prevail. In Nixon, the specific evidence sought was the
subject of the privilege claim, throwing more weight behind the claim
of executive privilege. 129 In Rayburn, on the other hand, the warrant
specifically sought only evidence not subject to the privilege; the
prosecution of Representative Jefferson rested solely on nonprivi-
leged evidence.' 30 Furthermore, procedural safeguards and investiga-
127 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
128 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656-57.
129 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687-88. Charges were brought against seven named individuals in
Nixon. Id. at 687. The subpoena duces tecum sought "certain tapes, memoranda, papers,
transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the
President" and the named defendants, which were identified specifically using White House
logs and appointment records. Id. at 687-88.
130 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656-57 (documenting the "special procedures" set forth in
the search warrant affidavit designed to limit the investigation of privileged information).
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tive filtering procedures were in place to control the privileged in-
formation incidentally uncovered. 31  Under these distinguishing
facts, it seems the interest for upholding the privilege is even weaker
in Rayburn than it was in Nixon.
Finally, analysis of Nixon and the treatment of the executive
privilege reveals substantial procedural protections available once the
constitutional privilege has been suspended, similar to those outlined
in relation to the Fifth Amendment privilege in Kastigar. Like the
burden-shifting mechanism described in Kastigar, a district court
which receives a claim of executive privilege in response to a sub-
poena must "treat the subpoenaed material as presumptively privi-
leged and ... require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the
Presidential material was 'essential to the justice of the [pending
criminal] case.' ,,132 In camera review is required so only those privi-
leged documents that are relevant and admissible lose their protec-
tion. 33 The district court is under a "very heavy responsibility" to
"scrupulous[ly] protect[] against any release or publication of mate-
rial not found by the court, [which is] admissible in evidence and
relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought."' 134 This de-
gree of protection is also afforded to those privileged items which do
not make it to trial, but instead are excised from evidence during in
camera review; "once the decision is made to excise, the material is
131 See supra text accompanying note 76. See also discussion infra Part IV.A.
132 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va.
1807)).
113 Id. at 714 ("Statements that meet the test of admissibility and relevance must be iso-
lated; all other material must be excised.").
134 Id. at714-15.
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restored to its privileged status and should be returned under seal to
its lawful custodian."' 35 Incorporating similar procedural safeguards
and standards of evidentiary protection in Speech or Debate Clause
jurisprudence may provide legislators with protection commensurate
to that conferred by the clause where the interest in preventing gov-
ernment corruption supersedes a claim of testimonial privilege.
III. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FILTERING PROCEDURES CAN ACCOMMODATE
LEGISLATORS' TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE IN THE COURSE OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The previous section argued for the recognition of a substan-
tial interest in combating government corruption136 and outlined pro-
cedural safeguards incorporated by other constitutional privileges
when they are suspended to pursue superseding prosecutorial inter-
ests. 137 While the Rayburn Court erred in dismissing the balancing of
interests called for in Gravel, if a court were to hold that the govern-
mental interest in preventing corruption outweighed the interest in
legislators' testimonial privilege, these procedural protections should
be applied in the Speech or Debate Clause context to provide as much
deference as possible to legislators' rights.1 38
To effectuate this change in Speech or Debate Clause juris-
prudence, internal Department of Justice ("DOJ") and statutory crite-
ria similar to those utilized in order to determine when to confer im-
135 Id. at 716.
136 See supra Part II.B.1.
137 See supra Part II.B.2-3.
138 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 n.4 (noting the application of the Speech or Debate
Clause testimonial privilege in the instant case is not "inconsistent with a sovereign inter-
est") (quoting Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419-20).
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munity should be developed to help U.S. Attorneys and courts, re-
spectively, decide when legislators' testimonial privilege should yield
to the specific interest in policing government corruption.'39 Manda-
tory in camera review should excise those privileged items not rele-
vant or admissible, with the District Court protecting privileged items
to the same standard as prescribed by the Court in Nixon. 140 During
in camera review, when legislators claim the privilege to communi-
cations, they should be presumptively protected, as is done under the
executive privilege.1 41  As is the case with the Fifth Amendment
privilege,1 42 if any subsequent prosecution occurs, a burden-shifting
mechanism should place a substantial burden on the prosecutors to
show that their evidence does not make use of privileged information.
Despite the promise in the procedural measures outlined
above, there are other additional options that can help accommodate
the fight against government corruption when legislators' Speech or
Debate Clause testimonial privilege is at issue. In the process of in-
vestigating Representative Jefferson, the FBI implemented numerous
filters and information control techniques designed to minimize in-
fringement of the Speech or Debate Clause privilege.143 Were these
or similar techniques to gain acceptance among courts, investigators,
and legislators, the burden placed on the courts to draw an appropri-
ate line between the competing interests would be minimized and the
139 See supra text accompanying note 114.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 132-35; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 714.
141 See supra text accompanying note 132.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
143 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656-57 (documenting the "special procedures" set forth in
the search warrant affidavit designed to limit the investigation of privileged information).
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danger of a slippery slope averted. 144 Additionally, grants of use im-
munity and the appointment of independent investigators might be
used to supplement the procedural protections and investigative filter-
ing procedures.
A. Analyzing the Filtering Procedures Used in United
States v. Rayburn
As mentioned above, the FBI undertook numerous procedural
safeguards and investigative filtering procedures in order to protect
Representative Jefferson's Speech or Debate Clause privilege in the
course of its investigation. This section will review the FBI tech-
niques used in the investigation of Representative Jefferson and pull
from them specific suggestions for internal guidelines which can best
accommodate the privilege in the context of future criminal investi-
gations.
1. Pre-warrant Safeguards
Not the least of the protections utilized in the investigation of
Representative Jefferson occurred before the search warrant was ever
issued. While speaking with one of Representative Jefferson's staff,
the FBI learned that records relevant to the specific charges being in-
vestigated were indeed in the Congressman's legislative office.
145
Significantly, the warrant affidavit "asserted that the Executive had
exhausted all other reasonable methods to obtain these records in a
144 It is appropriate here to echo the call of the Rayburn majority that the precise investi-
gative procedures designed to mediate between the competing interests at issue are some-
thing best determined by the legislative and executive branches themselves. See id. at 663.
141 Id. at 656.
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timely manner." 146
As contemplated by the warrant issued in Representative Jef-
ferson's investigation, legislative offices are bound to contain materi-
als protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 147 Therefore, having
pre-search requirements and preparations is necessary to effectively
accommodate legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privileges. Al-
though the approval of a search warrant necessitates a finding of
probable cause, 148 perhaps a requirement of particularized facts that
relevant information exists in a legislative office should be required.
As was the case with Representative Jefferson's investigation, such
particularized facts can be gathered by the more traditional and less
sensitive methods of interviewing staff, aides, and other participants
in a criminal enterprise. This requirement would simultaneously
shield legislators from the harassing fishing expeditions at the heart
of the Speech or Debate Clause's purpose. To further this end, before
searching a legislative office, all other reasonable methods of obtain-
ing the information at issue should be exhausted.
146 Id.
For months, the government repeatedly tried and failed-due in part to
Rep. Jefferson's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right-to obtain re-
cords in his congressional office via a series of subpoenae duces tecum.
Only after failing to obtain the records through investigative means
within Rep. Jefferson's ability to control did the government turn to a
search warrant. ...
Id. at 669 n.7 (Henderson, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
147 Id. at 661 (majority opinion).
148 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
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2. Post-warrant "Special Procedures"
A different set of safeguards governed the post-warrant phase
of the Representative Jefferson investigation. First, the agents who
carried out the actual raid of the Congressman's legislative office had
"no [other] substantive role in the investigation."' 149 These agents
were instructed "to review and seize paper documents responsive to
the warrant, copy all electronic files on the hard drives or other elec-
tronic media in the Congressman's office, and then turn over the files
for review by a filter team."'150 At the conclusion of this portion of
the investigation, the raiding agents transmitted the fruits of their
search to the filter team, and were instructed "not to reveal politically
sensitive or non-responsive items 'inadvertently seen ... during the
course of the search.' ,15
The filter team, consisting of two DOJ attorneys and one FBI
agent, was charged with determining "whether any of the seized
documents were not responsive to the search warrant, and . . .
whether any of the seized documents were subject to the Speech or
Debate Clause privilege or [any] other privilege."' 52 Those materials
subject to the Speech or Debate Clause testimonial privilege or non-
responsive to the warrant were returned to Representative Jefferson
without any dissemination to the prosecution team. Those materials
determined not privileged were given to prosecutors, with copies sent
to Representative Jefferson's lawyer. Finally, the district court would
149 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 656-57.
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review the materials the filter team determined potentially privileged,
keeping a log of such documents and providing copies to the Con-
gressman' s attorney. 
153
The investigation team's post-warrant procedures were sig-
nificantly less successful in minimizing infringement on Representa-
tive Jefferson's Speech or Debate Clause privileges. While screening
the investigatory agents from further involvement in the case is a
worthy protection, adding a separate filter team is an unnecessary
layer of bureaucracy. Were the filter team to actually conduct the
search of the office themselves, determining privilege status before
any items were taken from the office, less infringing material would
have been seized from Representative Jefferson. Moreover, fewer
executive agents would have been exposed to infringing material,
lessening any offense to the clause. Thus, in future investigations,
the filter team should consist of agents at the scene of the investiga-
tion who check for privilege status taking place on site to the extent
feasible.
The treatment of Representative Jefferson's computer files is
particularly troublesome. By merely copying all electronic material
in the Congressman's office, the executive presumably remained in
possession of countless privileged documents while the filter team
performed key word searches offsite. The search and seizure of elec-
tronic data presents investigators with unique problems, and the exact
search method employed in a particular case is determined by numer-
153 Id.
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ous factors beyond the scope of this Article. 15 4 The decision to copy
all electronic files from Representative Jefferson's office for later ex-
amination by the filter team was based primarily on the FBI's desire
to "minimize disruption" of Representative Jefferson's legislative du-
ties. 155 Although the use of a filter team is one of the "[p]referred
practices" identified by recent DOJ internal guidelines, 156 it was an
inadequate approach in Representative Jefferson's case because it al-
lowed an inordinate amount of privileged material to remain in the
hands of the executive unnecessarily. While it is true that the Speech
or Debate Clause protects members of Congress from distractions
that "divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative
tasks," 157 it seems the more egregious offense under the clause is ex-
ecutive possession of privileged material. No FBI investigation can
occur without at least minimal disruption of a legislator's time, 5 8 but
it does not follow that any more privileged material than necessary
should be taken from the legislator. Thus, in future investigations,
the use of a filter team may not be the best method of handling poten-
tially privileged electronic data.
154 For a review of issues inherent in the search and seizure of electronic data as well as
DOJ internal guidelines on the matter, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS (1994),
http://epic.org/security/computersearch-guidelines.txt [hereinafter FEDERAL GUIDELINES
FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS].
155 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 669-70 (Henderson, J., concurring).
156 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § II.B.7.b (2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm#Il [hereinafter
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS].
157 Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503).
158 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 669-70 (Henderson, J., concurring) ("[Tihe presence of FBI
agents executing a search warrant in a Member's office necessarily disrupts his routine...
.11).
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Courts' preferences vary widely in their support for a particu-
lar means of search and seizure of electronic data, and currently "no
single standard has emerged."'' 59 Aside from the use of filter teams,
common investigatory procedures for reviewing potentially privi-
leged electronic data include in camera review of all electronic data
and the appointment of third party "special masters."' 160 "Because a
single computer can store millions of files, judges will undertake in
camera review of computer files only rarely," making such a review
of all electronic materials too burdensome for a case like Representa-
tive Jefferson's. 161 However, the appointment of a "special master" is
ideally suited for review of Speech or Debate Clause applicability.
Although rarely utilized, "[a] neutral master . . . responsible to the
court [can be appointed and charged with] examin[ing] all the [elec-
tronic] documents [in order to] determine what is privileged.' 162
Even though special masters can take years to complete their re-
view, 163 their neutral nature is the best moderator of the important
separation of powers issues inherent in a Speech or Debate Clause
case. Many prosecutions of public officials already take years to
reach trial, 164 and the speed of a special master's review may be aided
159 SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 156, at § II.B.7.b.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 154, at §
IV.E.3.
163 SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 156, at § II.B.7.b.
164 For example, Tom Delay is still awaiting trial on some charges stemming from activi-
ties related to the 2002 election cycle, with no date currently set. Posting of Vince Lie-
bowitz, Earle Will Try Delay On Remaining Charges, Capitol Annex,
http://capitolannex.com/2007/09/28/earle-will-try-delay-on-remaining-charges/ (Sept. 28,
2007, 10:10 EST).
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by the appointment of a similarly neutral technical assistant.'65 Fu-
ture investigations of sitting legislators should thus utilize a special
master for the review of electronic data so that agents of the execu-
tive are not in extended possession of privileged material while elec-
tronic data is being searched.
Finally, implementing in camera judicial review for all poten-
tially privileged materials and shielding prosecutors from all privi-
leged materials are necessary safeguards that should be followed in
future investigations. As previously mentioned, in camera review of
privilege claims is essential to combating government corruption, as
neither side should have complete control of information in a white-
collar context. 166 There is precedent that shielding the prosecutor
from privileged information is valid regardless of the other investiga-
tory procedures used to obtain privileged materials. Although the
Rayburn majority held that its decision does not apply in the Speech
or Debate Clause context, the Supreme Court, in Weatherford v.
Bursey,1 67 distinguished between receiving privileged information
from an executive agent and receiving information from a prosecu-
tion team in a Sixth Amendment civil rights violation.16
8
B. Alternative Solutions
While the procedural safeguards and investigatory filtering
procedures described above are capable of providing worthwhile def-
165 FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS supra note 154, at §
IV.E.3.
166 See Ermann, supra note 81, at 71-72.
167 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
168 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (citing Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558).
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erence toward legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privileges in the
context of a criminal investigation, additional solutions and ap-
proaches are available. While the options discussed below may be
able to stand on their own as a policy approach, they are best concep-
tualized as supplemental to the solutions discussed earlier in this sec-
tion.
1. "Use" Immunity Grants
Historically, immunity statutes in the United States have con-
ferred one of two types of immunity. The first type, transactional
immunity, "grant[s] immunity from prosecution for offenses to which
compelled testimony relates, 1 69 but was largely abandoned in 1970
when the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
found that the immunity statutes in place conferred a greater benefit
to those compelled to testify than was necessary under the Constitu-
tion.170 The immunity statutes enacted since 1970 generally confer
"use" or "derivative use" immunity, which offers "immunity from the
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived [directly and indi-
rectly] therefrom."' 171
In the context of the Speech or Debate Clause testimonial
privilege, legislators subject to a raid by the executive could be
granted use immunity pertaining to any privileged material uncovered
during investigation. 72 As witness immunity is granted to those who
169 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443.
170 See id. at 452-53 n.36 (describing the transition from a preference for transactional
immunity to one for use immunity).
171 id. at 452-53.
172 Although current procedure involves no specific immunity grant, evidentiary conse-
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have evidence to offer against others under investigation, Speech or
Debate Clause immunity could be granted as to privileged materials
in a legislative office in order to obtain the nonprivileged material in
that office for use in prosecution. Consistent with the definition
above, such a grant would prohibit prosecutors from relying on any
privileged items uncovered in the investigation in any future prosecu-
tion. Moreover, they could not rely on any nonprivileged evidence
derived from privileged materials discovered in the investigation. As
mentioned in previous sections, the enforcement of these protections
is best accomplished through a burden-shifting mechanism that re-
quires prosecutors to affirmatively show they are not relying on
tainted evidence in any future prosecution.173
While the incorporation of a burden-shifting mechanism into
Speech and Debate Clause jurisprudence would be a worthwhile pro-
tection for legislators in the context of future prosecutions, the utility
of a specific use immunity grant in this context is limited. This is due
mainly to the fact that the Speech or Debate Clause is aimed at
broader interests than simply shielding legislators from harassing
criminal prosecutions. Rather, the clause seeks to protect an inde-
pendent legislature 17 4 and the integrity of the legislative process.
1 75
quences of some common law developments in Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence are
similar to those granted from statutory immunity. See, e.g., Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 673 n.13
(Henderson, J., concurring) ("At trial Rep. Jefferson may assert Speech or Debate Clause
immunity to bar the use of records he claims are privileged."); Fields v. Office of Eddie Ber-
nice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("When the Clause does not preclude suit al-
together .... [it] may preclude some relevant evidence.").
173 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
114 See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 502 ("The purpose of the Clause is to insure that the legisla-
tive function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently.").
175 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507 ("The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of
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In this sense, the clause is arguably offended by the mere revelation
of privileged information to another branch of government, regard-
less of whether or not a future prosecution flows from such a trans-
mission. 176  Thus, a grant of immunity can only offer a limited
amount of protection under the clause. Moreover, one understanding
of the Speech or Debate Clause, as advanced by the Third Circuit, is
that the clause already grants use immunity:
Unlike privileges such as attorney-client, physician-
patient, or priest-penitent, the purpose of which is to
prevent disclosures which would tend to inhibit the
development of socially desirable confidential rela-
tionships, the Speech or Debate privilege is at its core
a use privilege. The constitution clothes the legislator
with a use immunity, analogous in many ways to the
use immunity conferred upon witnesses.1
77
Nonetheless, specific grants of immunity could still serve a proce-
dural purpose, expediting the burden-shifting mechanisms in any fu-
ture prosecutions.
2. The Appointment of Independent Counsel
and Investigators
The new era of government corruption ushered in during the
Watergate scandal changed the way public figures are investigated in
numerous ways. Perhaps the most publicized change came in the
Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process.").
176 This was the view taken by the Rayburn majority, which held that "exchanges between
a Member of Congress and the Member's staff or among Members of Congress on legisla-
tive matters may legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility of
compelled disclosure may therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to legislative
activity." Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 66 1.
177 In re Grand Jury, 587 F.2d at 596 (internal citations omitted).
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form of the Independent Counsel Act, which called for judicially ap-
pointed prosecutors "in cases involving high government officials
where the 'personal, financial, or political conflict of interest' is too
great."' 178 From its inception in 1978 to its 1999 expiration, twenty-
one special investigations were pursued under the Act at a cost of
$166 million.179 Today, the appointment of these "Special Counsel"
units is governed by 28 C.F.R. § 600. Section 600.1 provides that the
Attorney General will appoint a special counsel for a criminal inves-
tigation when the investigation would present a conflict of interest
with the DOJ or United States Attorney's Office or otherwise consti-
tute "extraordinary circumstances," and it "would be in the public in-
terest to appoint outside [counsel]."' 80
Similar accommodations can be made for the investigation of
sitting legislators. Appointing Special Counsel to prosecute sitting
legislators may even be accommodated under the current regulations.
The prosecution of sitting legislators arguably satisfies the "extraor-
dinary circumstances" language above, and effectively prosecuting
government corruption is certainly in the public interest.' 8' However,
the use of special counsel as prosecutors only partially satisfies the
concerns the Speech or Debate Clause seeks to protect. If executive
agents are exposed to privileged materials during the investigation
phase, the clause is still offended regardless of the prosecutor's iden-
tity at trial.
178 From Watergate to Whitewater: History of the Independent Counsel, CNN.CoM, June
30, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/06/30/ic.history/.
179 Id.
"0 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2008).
181 See supra Part II.B.1.
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Thus, provisions allowing neutral Special Investigators should
accompany any implementation of a Special Counsel regulation
aimed at prosecuting those legislators protected by the Speech or De-
bate Clause. This allows the executive branch to be completely
shielded from involvement in the investigation as well as the trial,
comporting with the clause's goal of legislative independence. How-
ever, even this approach leaves numerous questions. Given the hefty
budget necessary for just twenty-one investigations under the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act, could the public interest justify the added costs
of independent investigators as well? Even if executive agents are
not exposed to privileged material, could the simple act of appointing
a special prosecutor and investigators run afoul of the Speech or De-
bate Clause because the executive is still ultimately responsible for
initiating a time-consuming investigation that will surely distract con-
gressmen from their legislative duties?
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1973, Michael Walzer proposed the problem of "dirty
hands," which argued that a "central feature of political life" is the
fact that there exists a ready population of those who are willing "to
hustle and lie for power and glory," entrenching such negative ac-
tions in the rules of the political game such that all those who are po-
litically successful are "necessarily hustlers and liars."1 82 Even if a
moderate version of this thesis is true, the amount of corruption in a
government the size of the United States system, influenced to an
182 Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
160, 161-63 (1973).
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ever-increasing degree by special interests, is surely staggering. In
Brewster, the Supreme Court noted that the Speech or Debate Clause
"must be interpreted in light of the American experience." '183 If such
a statement still holds true today, the clause should be interpreted in
light of the unprecedented levels of corruption seen in the federal
government over the past four decades.
The public interest in combating this corruption is certainly
substantial. The viability of any democracy rests in its people, and
nothing demolishes their faith and trust in government more fully
than crime and corruption among its principals. Thus, while the
privileges granted to our elected officials as necessary to fulfill their
duties must be respected, they should not grant subjects of a validly
executed criminal investigation carte-blanche control over the only
information that can convict them. Despite the fact that other consti-
tutional privileges accommodate the interests of law enforcement
long before passing this point-of-no-return, the District of Columbia
Circuit's ruling in Rayburn ensures that Speech or Debate Clause
privilege does not.
Therefore, the broad definition the Rayburn Court gave the
term "questioning" under the clause should be narrowed to no longer
encompass the execution of a valid search warrant. Rather, Judge
Henderson's approach in her Rayburn concurrence should prevail;
the holdings of Gravel and Brewster should be affirmed such that it is
clear that legislators are not exempt from criminal process under the
Speech or Debate Clause. Were the clause's scope rolled back in this
183 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
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manner, procedural safeguards and investigative filtering procedures
can still be implemented to protect the rights of legislators and the
balance of powers between branches. By drawing procedural ele-
ments from the treatment of other constitutional privileges, imple-
menting widely accepted investigatory filtering procedures designed
to safeguard privileged materials whenever possible, and utilizing use
immunity grants and independent investigators when necessary, it is
possible to strike a more appropriate balance between legislators'
Speech or Debate Clause rights and the interest in combating gov-
ernment corruption.
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